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hina’s pursuit of an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) has been called a po-
tential “game changer,” a weapon that could single-handedly shift the stra-
tegic balance with the United States. A retired U.S. Navy rear admiral asserted as 
early as 2005 that an ASBM capability could represent “the strategic equivalent 
of China’s acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964.”1 Whether or not this is accurate, 
an effective ASBM capability would undoubtedly constitute a formidable anti-
access weapon against the U.S. Navy in the western Pacifi c, particularly during a 
confl ict over Taiwan.2 However, as the Chinese literature demonstrates, it would 
mean more than that. Fully operational ASBM capability along with essential 
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance) support would be a barometer of China’s greater 
military modernization effort, a potential instrument for regional strategic am-
bitions, and perhaps an important element in tipping the long-term maritime 
strategic balance with respect to the United States.
Given China’s overall inferiority in long-range air 
and naval power, an ASBM would afford a power-
ful asymmetric means that could help deter the U.S. 
forces on their way to a zone of confl ict near China’s 
littoral borders. However, the ASBM represents more 
than just a single weapon platform. Rather, it is seen 
as “a system of systems” and a key step in achieving 
high-tech and information war capabilities.3 This is 
because the ability to launch a land-based ballistic 
missile at a moving target thousands of kilometers 
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away requires a wide range of support and information technologies far beyond 
just the missile itself. Certainly, the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is 
the core component of this system, and the technological demands in maneu-
vering, guidance, and homing to defeat defenses and fi nd its moving target at sea 
are formidable. However, an effective ASBM would also require the ability to de-
tect, identify, and track the target using some combination of land, sea, air, and 
space-based surveillance assets. Aside from the immediate software and hard-
ware, all of these functions would have to be highly integrated, fast reacting, and 
suffi ciently fl exible to attack the world’s most sophisticated and best defended 
naval target in the world today—a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group (CSG).
China’s interest in ASBM capability seems logical on the basis of its per-
ceptions of its strategic environment and as a natural outgrowth of its robust 
missile program. Yet at what stage is its development? While Andrew Erickson 
and David Yang (earlier in this issue) survey the Chinese literature regarding 
the strategic, policy, and doctrinal dimensions of the ASBM system, this ar-
ticle examines the development of several key components of the system and 
their operational readiness. It does so on the basis of the literature, supported 
by qualitative modeling where direct discussions of the system are particularly 
lacking, such as for space-based targeting.4 Finally, the article addresses some of 
the implications for the U.S. Navy and the naval strategic balance between the 
United States and China.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rarely discusses openly the develop-
ment of major new weapon systems, but the ASBM appears to be an exception. 
In an annual academic conference sponsored by the Second Artillery Engineer-
ing College, the proceedings clearly state that “in order to pierce the armor of a 
carrier . . . China is developing a new boost-glide ballistic missile . . . equipped 
with terminal guidance systems.”5 This startlingly direct admission reveals 
the level of commitment to the program within the military branch primar-
ily developing it. However, the building of such a system should not come as 
a surprise. As Erickson and Yang make clear, China’s military appears keenly 
interested in an ASBM capability, for a variety of reasons. Most important, the 
antiship ballistic missile comports with China’s perception of its security envi-
ronment and its strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. military. An ASBM 
could afford China a formidable asymmetric weapon against the United States 
in the western Pacifi c and would be particularly relevant to a confl ict over Tai-
wan. Moreover, an ASBM program is a feasible application for China’s mature 
and sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile technological developments.
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THE KILL CHAIN
While the concept of an ASBM system is evident at high-level discussions in the 
military, the ability to operationalize what is described as “a system of systems” 
involves a series of capabilities that go far beyond just the core missile compo-
nents.6 A complete ASBM system will require the ability to detect, identify, track, 
target, and engage a threat and then perform damage assessment upon it—the 
“kill chain.”7 Each of these sensor-to-shooter steps must be executed in a time-
sensitive manner, since the intended target would be maneuverable—a U.S. air-
craft carrier (or carrier strike group, comprising the carrier, its escorts, other 
missile-carrying ships, and support and other vessels assigned to its embarked 
commander). A complete kill chain entails a wide range of technologies, from 
penetration aids on board the missile, space-based and other sensors, data pro-
cessing and exchange networks, and other infrastructure to achieve a high de-
gree of integration of both the weapon platform and its command and control.8
The relevant literature stresses three technical challenges that would have to 
be resolved if China is to achieve an effective and reliable ASBM capability: fi rst, 
ensuring that an ASBM can defeat American missile defenses; second, equip-
ping a ballistic-missile weapon system to track and hit a moving target in its 
terminal phase; and last, providing accurate, real-time geolocation tracking and 
targeting data—particularly using space-based assets—to the missile system 
prior to launch.
The Missile’s Mission
There is little doubt that a variant of the Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) missile is the can-
didate for the ASBM.9 Moreover, much of the work to adapt the DF-21 for such 
a mission appears to have been developed in the late 1990s, such as an ablative 
shield against aerodynamic heating during reentry, vibration resistance, and op-
timization of the payload.10 There is also discussion of adding a third stage to 
the missile, not only to increase its range but to provide extra maneuverability in 
midcourse fl ight (discussed below).11 The third stage appears to be in develop-
ment, although several documents suggest that the missile and its maneuvering 
capabilities remain in the early research and experimental stages.12
Chinese sources go into detail about various methods of maneuvering dur-
ing a ballistic missile’s midcourse phase.13 Maneuvering increases the missile’s 
terminal target-seeking coverage so as to hit a moving target at sea. However, the 
impact of U.S. missile defenses—primarily the sea-based Aegis system equipped 
with SM-3, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Kinetic 
Energy Interceptor—on the missile’s survivability is also discussed.14 A number 
of measures are suggested to defeat them. Altering the missile’s fl ight path by 
employing a wavelike trajectory rather than a traditional parabolic fl ight path is 
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one method.15 In this scenario, the additional third stage of the DF-21 missile, 
with its hybrid liquid-solid fuel booster, is ignited several times to effect several 
wave patterns in the missile’s midcourse fl ight (see fi gure 1). Other methods 
include weaving, spiraling, spinning, and gliding—all of which would alter the 
traditional parabolic fl ight path of the ballistic missile and boost the missile’s 
penetration capabilities against American missile defenses, which depend heav-
ily on prediction of a missile’s fl ight trajectory.16
Controlled maneuvering in space should not be a “bottleneck technology,” 
according to one source, since China has already demonstrated real progress 
in “orbital maneuvering and docking” under the Shenzhou program.17 How-
ever, other publications suggest that research and experiments involving wave 
and gliding trajectories began only in 2003, de novo, and there is no evidence 
that China has made breakthroughs in this area.18 Moreover, the academic treat-
ments of these exo-atmospheric maneuvers appear to be largely theoretical in 
nature.19 For instance, they do not systematically address the problem of how to 
“maintain guidance [for the target] during the whole trajectory,” which other 
articles insist is a technical challenge China must overcome.20 In fact, the tech-
nical discussion does not directly connect midcourse maneuvering with the 
ASBM system, as several general analyses do, suggesting that such linkage is 
only conceptual. Also, the omission of alternative, traditional countermeasures 
and decoys seems impractical;21 a number of prominent American specialists 
believe that China would likely be able to defeat midcourse interceptors using 
FIGURE 1
WAVE TRAJECTORY
Source: Gu Liangxian, Gong Chunlin, and Wu Wuhua, “Design and Optimization of Wavy Trajectory for Ballistic Missiles.”
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relatively low-tech means.22 The simplest countermeasure of all may be simply 
to launch a salvo of missiles; U.S. missile defenses would not likely be able to 
destroy them all.23
China has already demonstrated many of the core technologies required for 
such a system. While adapting off-the-shelf technologies to an ASBM system 
is both logical progression and feasible, the literature appears ambiguous as to 
their application to a new environment (penetrating missile defenses) and an 
evolved mission (hitting a moving target at sea).
Terminal Guidance and Homing
A second area that has received substantial attention in the technical literature 
is the demand for reentry and terminal guidance of the warhead. Opinions on 
this point appear to vary considerably more than with other aspects of the sys-
tem. Some observers are cautious about such a program, seeing the signifi cant 
technical hurdles inherent in a complex ASBM system. A key issue according to 
most analyses is the speed of the warhead. Reentry into the atmosphere at high 
speed (2.2–5 km/sec) would produce a plasma shield, making homing by ra-
dar and infrared diffi cult.24 However, “to control the missile’s speed in order to 
switch from midstage guidance [inertial] to terminal stage guidance [homing] 
will require an overload that will be diffi cult to achieve.”25 Aside from the dif-
fi culties of controlling the missile’s velocity, a lower terminal speed would make 
the warhead more vulnerable to missile defenses.26 Others fear that the range of 
maneuverability of the carrier could be suffi cient to evade the missile, even with 
active homing systems.27 A number of other constraints to developing a reliable 
ASBM are also discussed. For instance, can the warhead attack its target at the 
desired angle—to pierce the carrier’s armor—given the constraints of the mis-
sile’s trajectory after reentry and the requirements of radar and infrared hom-
ing?28 Also, can the missile carry suffi cient antijamming capabilities?29
Nonetheless, the majority of studies indicate that the technical obstacles are 
well within China’s ability to resolve. For example, controlling the speed of the 
missile after reentry is diffi cult but possible. A number of authors suggest a 
“pulling up” maneuver at an altitude of between twenty-fi ve and fi fty kilome-
ters to level off the ballistic trajectory, positioning the warhead to search for its 
target.30 The change in trajectory would also act as a defense-penetration aid.31 
As for guiding the missile to its target, a number of studies argue that the speed 
and maneuverability of an aircraft carrier are probably too limited to evade an 
MRBM in the terminal phase.32 As fi gure 2, adapted from a Chinese study, illus-
trates, the “kill radius” (the distance the target could deviate from initial posi-
tion and still be struck) of a terminally guided ASBM missile that has reduced 
its speed to allow for active homing to seek its target is approximately twenty 
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kilometers.33 This assumes the missile has accurate prelaunch target coordinates 
(discussed later) and that the missile’s fl ight time (also, the time the carrier has 
to maneuver) is limited to roughly fi fteen minutes. If the system is relying on 
space-based targeting, this is likely an overly optimistic scenario;34 however, as-
suming that it is possible, an aircraft carrier could not evade the missile even 
if traveling at thirty-fi ve knots. Using guidance in both the midcourse (for in-
stance, millimeter-wave radar) and terminal (radar or infrared) phases could 
increase the attack radius to forty kilometers, according to one study.35
Another source draws the conclusion—using a different simulation—that 
the warhead could have a kill radius of one hundred kilometers once terminal 
guidance was engaged.36 In a discussion in Naval and Merchant Ships, Dong Lu 
calculates the maximum distance at which the basic radar terminal guidance of 
a similar missile system, the retired U.S. Pershing II, could detect a carrier that 
had maneuvered for fi fteen minutes, given a scanning height for the missile’s 
radar of nineteen kilometers.37 Terminal guidance of an ASBM would appear 
to be a feasible adaptation of missile systems with which China has had suc-
cess (surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, and antiship cruise missiles).38 Still, 
a number of unique technical obstacles remain, such as the materials needed to 
protect sophisticated guidance systems during reentry;39 the ability to function 
in an environment of higher speed and more severe temperature dynamics than 
FIGURE 2
ASBM KILL RADIUS
Source: Chen Haidong et al., “Study for the Guidance Scheme of Reentry Vehicles Attacking Slowly Moving Targets.”
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in earlier applications;40 and the ability to distinguish a target at unusual angles 
of attack at the distances required for reentry.41
A number of publications view U.S. missile defenses as a primary concern 
for the ASBM in its terminal phase as well as midcourse. Some believe that the 
ASBM will have to slow down considerably in order to locate and maneuver to 
the carrier, making it a much more manageable problem for missile defenses.42 
Others see the diffi culties in fending off electronic jamming and measures 
against active-radar terminal seekers.
In sum, in the available literature on the ASBM that began to proliferate in 
the late 1990s, one can see the rough outline of a technical evolution. Discus-
sions are now less theoretical and conceptual in nature and are instead more 
systematic and detailed. Earlier studies were broader in scope, addressing large 
portions of the kill chain, from launch to target impact.43 Since then, studies 
have become increasingly specifi c, focusing on particular engineering problems, 
within limited ranges of analysis.44 Further, some earlier studies laid out con-
ceptual proposals that contained glaring technical inconsistencies; later docu-
ments have been more concerned with applications and have been underpinned 
by carefully scrutinized simulations.45 Finally, in later publications one can read 
of specifi c research and testing being done on component technologies. For in-
stance, early experiments on high-altitude gliding of the missile frame appear to 
have begun.46 Likewise, testing on “active radar guided weapon systems aimed 
at maritime targets” has been conducted, although not “under heavy sea condi-
tions and a small grazing angle,” as the authors admit would be necessary to an 
operational evaluation.47 Notwithstanding, if these examples may illustrate a 
concrete progression in core components of the ASBM system, they also reveal 
that work on the many secondary technical issues is just beginning. In addition, 
it has been clearly realized that theory and even testing are not substitutes for 
combat experience, of which China has none in this realm.48
Missing Links
To strike any target with an ASBM, China would have fi rst to form an accurate 
idea of its recent location. In the kill-chain formulation, this would comprise 
detecting, identifying, tracking, targeting, and engaging the threat. The Chinese 
literature on this aspect of the ASBM system is generally pessimistic that the 
PLA has enough of the key technologies to realize such a system.
Detecting the carrier at great distances would depend on early-warning sys-
tems, such as sky-wave, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, or electronic signals in-
telligence, that would give a general idea of the target’s geographic coordinates.49 
There is substantial evidence that China has at least one over-the- horizon-
backscatter (OTH-B) system up and running.50 It could be used to identify 
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targets at long range, although with a tracking error of from twenty to forty 
kilometers (substantially lower than the American OTH accuracy, roughly eight 
to thirty kilometers) it would be unable to perform reliable target location inde-
pendently.51 An ASBM attack radius of roughly twenty kilometers, as discussed 
above, would correlate only to the extreme, best-possible performance of Chi-
na’s OTH tracking, and even then only for a stationary carrier. Long-distance 
early warning could also come from electronic and signal intelligence (ELINT 
and SIGINT), whether airborne, shipborne, or space based. China’s ability to 
use airborne and shipborne electronic surveillance would be limited, however, 
since both would require a dangerously close approach to the carrier group. The 
open-source literature is almost completely silent on China’s current on-orbit 
ELINT/SIGINT assets, but indirect evidence indicates that it either does have 
such capabilities or is actively developing them.52
Once the carrier is identifi ed, its position needs to be pinpointed. Long-range 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could gather such information. China is ap-
parently committed to investing in such a program and has several operational 
high- and medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs, with others planned, capable 
of carrying out reconnaissance far out at sea. The Xianglong, currently China’s 
largest UAV, appears to have a combat radius of 2,000–2,500 kilometers (that 
is, a range of 7,500 kilometers), a mission payload of six hundred kilograms, 
and a maximum endurance of ten hours.53 It can also carry electronic jamming 
pods to defend against antiradiation missiles, as well Global Positioning System 
jamming and antijamming capabilities. However, the Xianglong is believed still 
to lack suffi cient high-altitude endurance for an anticarrier mission. Moreover, 
China still lacks C4ISR infrastructure—such as information processing, band-
width capacity, and network support—needed for wide-area surveillance at the 
level of the U.S. Broad Area Maritime System.54 Further, even a fully capable 
UAV could be vulnerable to a carrier group’s formidable air and electronic de-
fenses—assuming the carrier(s) and accompanying ships were not operating in 
electronic silence in order not to announce their approach—before it could pro-
vide targeting information; thus the UAV alone is not a reliable option.55 Theo-
retically, if advanced enough, UAV capabilities would be adequate for targeting 
if combined with other terrestrial cueing systems, such as OTH. However, the 
open-source literature clearly views these capabilities as currently insuffi cient to 
deal with superior U.S. naval power.
Overall, China’s current UAV capabilities and the risks involved in obtain-
ing targeting information from surface combatant vessels or air forces near the 
CSG strongly suggest that the PLA would not depend solely upon these plat-
forms to determine the exact location of the target. Others have surmised that 
the Chinese military could utilize such alternatives as China’s growing fl eet of 
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stealthy submarines, or even merchant fi shing vessels, to supply targeting data.56 
For example, the PLA Navy submarine force, with its increasing number of quiet 
attack submarines, offers another conceivable alternative for tracking targets 
at sea. These are not optimal means, but they are immediately available and 
could be part of an interim capability or emergency backup. To what degree 
these methods would be relied on in a time of confl ict is debatable;57 a robust 
and reliable targeting system to support the ASBM, of which space-based recon-
naissance would be a key element, appears to be a high priority.58 Regardless, 
and given the widespread assumption that space-based targeting is critical, does 
China have enough of the right type of satellites to fi nd a carrier and view it fre-
quently enough to be sure of its location, and if so, can it process and transmit 
the data to the launch pad quickly enough?
Space-Based Targeting
The literature reveals a consensus that a space-based reconnaissance system, 
though critical to the effective operation of conventional missiles, remains 
the weakest link in China’s targeting capabilities.59 Two areas of concern are 
prevalent. The fi rst involves the physical limitations of China’s current space 
infrastructure for reconnaissance. While many Chinese satellites have suffi cient 
imaging resolution (given the size of the target and its radar cross section, reso-
lution demands are not high), the systemwide revisit rate is inadequate for sus-
tained coverage.60 Other articles show a lack of confi dence in China’s ability to 
locate moving targets using imaging satellites, arguing the need for electronic 
surveillance satellites to augment them.61 But the problem is more than quanti-
ty, as others argue: fi tting the various components of C4ISR into a seamless net-
work remains a huge challenge for China.62 This last issue involves technological 
system limitations, but it also entails organizational and bureaucratic barriers 
impeding the ability of disparate space assets to perform highly time-sensitive 
missions.63 In short, the literature strongly indicates that space infrastructure 
for the ASBM targeting likely remains underdeveloped.64
China has a maximum of twenty-two imaging space assets that could poten-
tially assist in identifying, locating, and tracking a carrier group. Only nine of 
the imaging satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) are classifi ed as military; howev-
er, given the dual-use nature of many of the civilian space assets, the possibility 
that other nominally nonmilitary satellites could be tasked in a time of confl ict 
cannot be discounted. The lingering question is how well all of these space as-
sets can be integrated, both within the military and across the civilian/military 
divide. Assuming the best, what time lag would occur in the processing of this 
imagery? While the degree of integration of China’s various dual-use assets is 
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impossible to assess quantitatively and precisely from public sources, a number 
of reported characteristics demonstrate that it is certainly not seamless.
Institutional barriers are frequently identifi ed as a potential obstacle to inte-
grating the diverse ownership and operating arrangements of China’s space as-
sets. This could be particularly acute in applying space assets to a time-sensitive 
mission, such as C4ISR support for an ASBM strike on a U.S. carrier, that would 
require a closely coordinated space architecture.
For instance, how would the two services critical to executing an ASBM mis-
sion—the Second Artillery and the PLA Navy (PLAN)—fi t into the military aero-
space sector, which would provide critical support?65 This issue is compounded 
by the fact that command and control over China’s military space capabilities is 
itself not unifi ed. Nor are the lines of authority clear between the military and 
China’s unique and diverse civilian and government space organization, a fact 
that would have an impact both on the use of space assets and on the real-time 
exchange of data across a large, interagency information network.66
China’s satellite program is highly decentralized. The PLA unquestionably 
plays the most prominent role in overseeing China’s dual-use space infrastruc-
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least a dozen agencies spread across the government, universities, and the quasi-
private sector—in addition to the military.
The primary authority over launch facilities and on-orbit command and con-
trol is the General Armaments Department (GAD), while the overall military 
operation of satellites is the purview of various departments within the General 
Staff Department (GSD). Furthermore, approximately 75 percent of China’s 
space-based assets are essentially under nonmilitary entities, such as the China 
Meteorological Agency, the State Oceanographic Agency, and a number of state-
owned enterprises. These are peacetime operators, and the transfer of authority 
and expertise to the PLA during a time of confl ict is cited as a concern among 
some in the military.67
Achieving commonality would require bridging between essentially coequal 
military bureaucracies (such as GAD and GSD) and different levels of military 
CMC: Central Military Commission    CASC: China Aeronautics Science and Technology Corporation
GPD: General Politics Department    CAST: China Academy of Space Technology
GSD: General Staff Department    CMA: China Meteorological Agency
GAD: General Armaments Department   SOA: State Oceanographic Agency
PLAN: PLA Navy     NCDR: National Committee for Disaster Reductions
PLAAF: PLA Air Force     MLR: Ministry for Land and Resources
MND: Ministry of National Defense    S&T Min: Science and Technology Ministry
MOE: Ministry of Education    SBSM: State Bureau for Surveying & Mapping
BOSTIND: Bureau of Science & Technology Industry for National Defense NRSC: National Remote Sensing Center
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bodies (GAD and the Second Artillery, the PLA Air Force, the PLAN, and the 
seven military regions), as well as between military and nonmilitary agencies 
(e.g., the PLAN and the State Oceanographic Agency).68 In short, integration 
of the command and application of on-orbit assets would entail coordination 
horizontally and vertically within the military as well as across military and 
civilian organizations. In theory, the overall control the military has over the 
space program, combined with the improved and soon to be promulgated Na-
tional Defense and Mobilization Law, will likely provide suffi cient authority to 
coordinate command and control over space during a confl ict.69 Nevertheless, 
limiting the transaction cost in working with so many agencies could be critical 
in such time-sensitive demands as an ASBM combat mission. Since the mili-
tary is deeply involved in the space program, lines of authority may be clearer 
than is apparent from open-source evidence, yet the increasingly vociferous 
calls for a more coherent space leadership and legal guarantees applying to time 
of confl ict signal a lack of integration.70 The initial confusion over organizing 
remote-sensing data from domestic and foreign sources during the Wenchuan 
earthquake is, if nothing else, testimony to the diffi culties inherent in such a 
system.71
Moreover, the command structure remains vague within the military itself. 
To take an operational example, the plausible use of space for an ASBM mission 
would require at a minimum a highly coordinated effort between satellite space 
support, missile launch operators, and the navy. No independent PLA organiza-
tion exists to ensure this, although several services are vying for organizational 
leadership of the military space program, including the air force, GAD, GSD, 
and the Second Artillery.72
MODELING: CHINA’S SPACE ISR FOR TARGETING
Assuming that China’s space assets were suffi ciently integrated to support an 
ASBM mission during a confl ict, the question remains as to whether the sum 
of all its satellite capabilities would be large enough to succeed. To be confi dent 
that it can launch an attack on a carrier group at a time of its choosing, China 
would need to update the group’s location as often as possible.73 Its ability to do 
this would depend on the orbits of its satellites and the capabilities of the sensors 
each carries.74
The frequency with which an individual satellite revisits a location depends 
on both its orbit and the maneuverability of its sensors. In the low latitudes 
where a Taiwan-related confl ict would occur, it could take between fi ve and 
twenty-nine days for one of China’s reconnaissance satellites to pass directly 
over the same point twice. However, by pointing its cameras or sensors side-
ways—that is, aiming “off nadir,” not only straight down—a satellite can image 
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from adjacent passes, greatly increasing the revisit rate. The modeling below 
uses two sets of off-nadir angles to provide both average or realistic, as well as 
maximum, scenarios.75
In the task of fi nding a U.S. carrier at sea, China’s satellites would vary in their 
usefulness according to sensor type and resolution. Of the sensors deployed on 
China’s satellites, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is the most useful for hunting 
maritime targets, as it can sweep a relatively wide swath at a resolution good 
enough to image fairly small targets.76 SAR can produce imagery regardless of 
weather or sunlight. Instead of merely looking for a carrier group itself, SAR can 
capture ship wakes trailing over large stretches of ocean, making it particularly 
useful for fi nding moving targets. Multispectral and hyperspectral sensors can 
also be very effective. For instance, they could spot algae and other phospho-
rescent material churned up by ships. Infrared and regular visible-light images 
could also be useful, but they would have relatively narrow foci and could not 
scan vast stretches of ocean.
Like most aspects of the military space program, the exact sensor capabilities 
of China’s satellites are closely guarded secrets. However, general sensor infor-
mation is available for most satellites (see the table). According to open sources, 
only four of China’s satellites in low earth orbit, all in the military Yaogan se-
ries, are equipped with SAR. Other satellites, nominally intended for weather 
monitoring, survey, or other civilian uses, could potentially be of use during a 
confl ict. Satellites like the CBERS, Haiyang, Fengyun, and Huanjing types carry 
multi- and hyperspectral sensors that could be used to locate military targets. 
Satellite Sensor Capabilities
Ziyuan-2A Charge-coupled device (CCD); infrared multispectral scanner; capable of 
generating high-quality (< 3 m resolution)
Jianbing-3B (Ziyuan-2B) High-resolution CCD camera; infrared multispectral scanner
Jianbing-3C (Ziyuan-2C) High-resolution CCD cameras; infrared multispectral scanner
Yaogan-1 SAR (5 m resolution, high resolution: 5 × 5 m target discrimination at 40 km, 
low resolution: 20 m × 20 m at 100 km)
Yaogan-2 Electro-optical; multispectral sensors (1 m resolution)
Yaogan-3 SAR (high resolution: < 5 × 5 m)
Yaogan-4 Electro-optical (0.5 m resolution)
Yaogan-5 SAR
Yaogan-6 SAR (estimated ground resolution of 0.6–1 m)
Tansuo-1 (Shiyan-1) High-resolution electro-optical; near infrared; CCD survey cameras (10 m 
resolution; image swath of 120 km wide)
Tansuo-2 (Shiyan-2) Electro-optical
Shiyan-3 Electro-optical
CHINESE SATELLITE IMAGING CAPABILITIES
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Simulation
In the lead-up to an ASBM launch, how good would China’s view from space 
be? Our simulation of the satellite ground tracks and revisit rates of China’s 
imaging satellites (nine military and thirteen civilian) shows that even in a best-
case scenario, coverage is intermittent and punctuated by long blackouts dur-
ing which no imagery can be obtained.77 Counting all twenty-two satellites and 
assuming the widest fi eld of view (that is, up to sixty degrees off nadir), the 
average time between revisits is forty-fi ve minutes, with fourteen passes over 
the selected target areas each day—but with nine gaps in coverage of two hours 
or longer. The worst-case scenario, counting only military-designated satellites 
and imaging a conservative fi eld of view (thirty degrees off nadir or less), gives 
an average of eight passes per day. In both scenarios, however, coverage is not 
evenly distributed, with large gaps of fi ve and a half to ten hours, depending on 
fi eld of view.78 Overall, China was “in the dark” for sixty-nine of the seventy-two 
Satellite Sensor Capabilities
Haiyang-1B Chinese Ocean Color and Thermal Scanner; pixel resolution: 1.1 km (nadir); 
the swath width is ~1,600 km; fi eld of vision (swath pixels per scan line ±55 
degrees at 2,800 km); focal length of optical system: 650 mm for visible near 
infrared, 190 mm for thermal infrared; telescope aperture diameter 200 mm
CBERS-1 Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km); 
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath width: 113 km); infrared multispectral 
scanner (resolution: 80 m); thermal channel: 160 m; swath width: 120 km; off-
nadir capability of ±32 degrees 
CBERS-2 Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km); 
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath: 113 km); infrared multispectral scanner 
(resolution: 80 m); thermal channel: 160 m; swath width: 120 km; off-nadir 
capability of ±32 degrees
CBERS-2B Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km); 
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath width: 113 km); high-resolution camera 
(resolution: 2.7 m; swath width: 27 km); also near- infrared bands
Huanjing-1A Multispectral CCD camera (resolution: 30 m; swath 700 km with two cameras); 
infrared sensors (30 m spatial resolution), real-time imaging; optical
Huanjing-1B Hyperspectral; infrared (30 m spatial resolution); real-time imaging; optical 
sensor
Fengyun-1D Visible, infrared, and microwave
Fengyun-3A Spatial resolution of 250 m; 10-channel visible and infrared radiometer (VIRR); 
moderate resolution visible and infrared imager (MODI); microwave radiation 
imager (MWRI), measures thermal microwave emissions using six frequency 
points in dual polarizations; infrared atmospheric sounder (IRAS) 
Chuangxin (CX-102) Microsatellite; electro-optical
Beijing-1 (Tsinghua) Panchromatic image (4 m resolution); multispectral images (32 m resolution); 
infrared band wavelength (774 nm to 900 nm)
CHINESE SATELLITE IMAGING CAPABILITIES CONTINUED
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hours simulated. Still, between the long gaps there were several notable clusters 
of satellite passes in which frequent imagery could be gathered.79 The most opti-
mistic list of all China’s imaging satellites yields three notable periods in which 
up to eight satellites make passes within an hour and a half. These few instances 
of relative operational clarity would be good opportunities for launch, but the 
U.S. Navy would no doubt be conscious of these fl eeting moments and plan its 
maneuvers and defenses accordingly.
Filling the Gaps
In their regular orbits, China’s satellites do not appear capable of gathering time-
ly, on-demand data for targeting; however, in a time of confl ict China would 
employ several measures to boost coverage. First, it would shift satellites into 
more advantageous orbits to gain imagery sooner and more often than their 
regular orbits would allow. But altering orbits is no easy feat, and each move 
requires intensive planning and calculation. We did not model the numerous 
potential rearrangements for this article; however, useful comparisons can be 
derived from other technical studies. Some analyses, restricting fuel expendi-
tures to a reasonable amount, have illustrated that the average time between 
revisits of a designated location can be decreased by 36.4 percent.80 While the 
fuel capacities of China’s military-designated satellites are likely large enough to 
FIGURE 4
SATELLITE SIMULATION (DAY 1)
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allow more fuel for orbital shifts, it should be remembered that because a CSG 
is not a stationary point, orbits would have to be continually changed, in accor-
dance with its suspected location.
China could also plug holes in its coverage by launching microsatellites.81 
These could be technologically similar to the Huanjing or Haiyang series, which 
are effective for maritime reconnaissance and are small enough to launch rela-
tively quickly with small rockets.82 However, microsatellites come with signifi -
cant trade-offs. Their small size and power reserves are not well suited to large, 
electricity-hungry radar systems, and their downlink capabilities are restricted 
by small antennas and limited fi elds of view.83 Some of these challenges may be 
surmountable, with several studies suggesting that networked constellations or 
special antennas could improve microsatellite performance.84 China’s exact ca-
pabilities in these areas are not publicly known, but suffi ce it to say that the PLA 
will face major technological obstacles to integrating microsatellites seamlessly 
into its larger C4ISR picture.
China would also face challenges in putting microsatellites into orbit. Small-
er solid-fuel rocket systems such as the Kaituozhe (Pioneer) are likely under 
development;85 nonetheless, the ability to launch “responsively” and in larger 
numbers is often cited by Chinese strategists as a bottleneck problem for Chi-
na’s military space program, due to limitations in fi xed launch sites as well 
as telemetry, tracking, and control (TTC) stations.86 TTC stations and launch 
facilities are also seen as highly vulnerable to attack. Nevertheless, the ability to 
quickly put small satellites into low earth orbit using small, solid-fuel rockets 
provides signifi cant opportunities to reduce vulnerability. As for the diffi cul-
ties in simultaneously launching larger numbers of satellites, during the last 
several years China has increased its number of satellite launches in short win-
dows of time, with a peak of seven during a four-month period in 2004, dem-
onstrating an ability to maintain a higher tempo of satellite launches and TTC 
activity.87 In addition, the construction of the space launch facility in Hainan 
Island would increase China’s overall launch and TTC capability.88
Long-Term Plans
In the Haiyang and Huanjing series alone, China could launch within the next 
fi ve years between eight and twelve new-generation satellites that would be ca-
pable of maritime surveillance, and eight to twelve more in the fi ve years there-
after. These are tentative estimates, but they are also only the plans currently 
made public (posted as Table A-1 at the end). Moreover, these estimates do not 
include satellites launched for dedicated military use, such as the Ziyuan or Yao-
gan series. Information on those programs is far less clear, but extrapolating 
from their rates of launch over the past few years, on-orbit assets of these types 
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could increase from their current nine to more than fi fteen within a fi ve-year 
period. The steady progress in the satellite sensor technology and the empha-
sis placed on remote-sensing technology overall in the last two fi ve-year plans 
and the space white papers suggest little reason to doubt that recent trends will 
continue. In theory, the remote-sensing capabilities needed for near-continuous 
coverage within the Asia-Pacifi c region could be achieved within fi ve years and 
a broader, continuous global coverage within ten years. How much these addi-
tional satellites will improve China’s ability to pinpoint targets at sea will depend 
on the degree to which they are optimized for such a mission. However, China’s 
space program is highly “dual use” in nature, run by numerous agencies, and 
applied to many missions, both military and civilian; thus, specifi c analysis of 
its development is crucial.
Measuring Up
The most obvious benchmark for China’s space reconnaissance programs is 
parity with those of the United States. Judging from publicly available data, the 
United States has roughly fourteen LEO satellites dedicated to providing imag-
ery.89 While U.S. reconnaissance satellites are technically advanced, the system’s 
temporal resolution is not dramatically better than that of China. Where the 
United States defi nitively leads China is in the area of data processing and inte-
gration. Perhaps the most important aspect of the American space reconnais-
sance system is its ability to pool imagery from a variety of military, civilian, and 
commercial services and distribute it in a timely fashion. Within fi ve minutes of 
its capture by a satellite, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency can begin 
analyzing an image and can then transmit it to fi eld commanders within sec-
onds.90 Reports from 2003 operations in Iraq put the time from target identifi ca-
tion to strike at less than fi fteen minutes.91 This speed depends on an intricate 
web of data-relay satellites, such as the Milstar, TDRSS, and NAVSTAR systems, 
the equivalents of which China does not yet possess.
At present, neither country has the capability to watch a target continuously 
from space, even in a regional confl ict. The United States has put forward plans 
to build space-based radar and imaging systems that approach global, near-
continuous coverage, but the two proposed projects have encountered funding 
disagreements and exceeded budgets.92 Both projects are currently stalled, and 
their futures remain uncertain.
Most useful to China, particularly in the context of acquiring targets for an 
ASBM, would be capabilities similar to the Discoverer II project, such as satel-
lites equipped with both SAR and the Ground Moving Target Indicator system 
(which uses Doppler pulses to locate moving objects in a wide fi eld of view, mak-
ing it particularly useful for watching ocean traffi c).93 However, while China 
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would not need the full constellation of twenty-four satellites proposed in the 
U.S. system to support a regional confl ict, the cost would still be prohibitive. 
Including the extensive complementary ground systems required, the U.S. Con-
gressional Budget Offi ce estimated the total cost of the Starlite/Discoverer II 
project to be between $25 and $90 billion.94 However, if the PLA intends to deter 
the U.S. Navy credibly with conventional missile programs, China may indeed 
need to make extravagant expenditures in space. The American military’s de-
pendence on satellite imagery is tempered by a highly developed UAV program 
and overwhelming air superiority, but China presently lacks such advantages.
BEYOND AN ANTISHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE
Is China developing an antiship ballistic missile? The literature is fairly con-
clusive that China’s military is keenly interested in the system and could le-
verage a number of off-the-shelf technologies, particularly with regard to the 
DF-21 missile system itself, in developing one. However, the theoretical and 
less-than-systematic nature of technical studies indicates that the research and, 
in some cases, testing of component technologies remain in their early phases. 
Furthermore, a fully operational and effective ASBM is a complex system that 
requires a network of ground, air, sea, electronic, and information infrastruc-
tures, most of which lag far behind the missile technology itself. Among these, 
a key underdeveloped system is precision targeting of a maneuverable object at 
long range, particularly the space-based segment. Real-time, continuous cover-
age of the maritime regions where China would most likely engage a U.S. carrier 
strike group would require a far better developed early-warning, imaging, and 
communication space architecture, along with more ground support, than it 
currently has. China’s imaging capability alone remains far from suffi cient to 
provide the high revisit rates needed for an effective ASBM capability. There 
are remedial short-term options, such as rapid launch of additional satellites or 
use of the full suite of civilian and government satellites, but all have strategic 
drawbacks for China.
The most immediate obstacle to utilizing China’s full spectrum of space assets 
lies in the fact that this is a highly dual-use area. Interservice and interagency 
cooperation, particularly coordination in the areas of technology development, 
data sharing, command, and future investment in on-orbit assets, all raise thorny 
problems for application to a specifi c military mission.95 The example of Beidou 
and the long development process that has plagued it testifi es to the diffi culties 
inherent in an expensive and complex dual-use project.96 For these and many 
other reasons, these critical components of space-based support will collec-
tively represent a diffi cult and slow sector in the development of a battle-ready 
ASBM. In fact, much of the thinking on how to accomplish this has only just 
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begun. Yet in an optimistic estimate based on China’s current trajectory of mil-
itary space asset programs, as well as its overall plans for a variety of imaging 
and communication satellites, a system competent to provide near-real-time 
regional coverage could be fi ve years away, while global coverage could be at-
tainable within ten years.
Most of the attention in military circles has been narrowly focused on China’s 
ASBM. But what are the broader implications of this “system of systems” for 
China’s military modernization? If China eventually acquires a complete tar-
geting network to complement an ASBM capability, the Chinese military could 
conceivably adapt the system to other launch platforms (e.g., ships), other mis-
siles (short-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles), or relevant technologies 
(missile defense). The parallels with the conventionalization of U.S. strategic 
weapons (“global strike”) become unavoidable.97 While it is merely conjecture, 
one could infer—from the advances made in China’s short-range ballistic mis-
sile numbers and capabilities facing Taiwan, in addition to ASBM and even 
antisatellite testing—an emerging PLA strategy aimed more at missile-based, 
asymmetrical deterrence than parity in hardware. Do these trends point to a 
growing missile-centric PLA doctrine? Perhaps, but there are just as many voic-
es clamoring for a strategy of mimicking American weapons platforms (such 
as an aircraft carrier) as there are proponents of a greater reliance on deterrent, 
asymmetrical systems.
While an operational ASBM may be some time away, the impact of such a 
system on the stability of U.S.-China strategic relations and on the region would 
be substantial. Short of using it in a confl ict—a scenario nearly impossible to 
imagine—a number of questions arise regarding the effect an ASBM capability 
might have on both Chinese and American behavior. How would an ASBM alter 
China’s perception of its strategic environment? Would an operational ASBM 
merely provide greater assurance against American intervention in a Taiwan 
confl ict, or would it embolden Beijing to act more aggressively? What about Chi-
na’s deterrent posture, which it consistently frames as solely defensive? It is in 
this sense that Chinese and American perspectives perhaps clash the most. Chi-
na argues that intent, not merely capabilities, decides behavior.98 China would 
thus contend that an additional weapon capability will not infl uence its future 
actions. The United States would hold that capability is far more important to 
infl uencing behavior and that a better-armed China might pursue objectives it 
otherwise would not. For nuclear weapons, with an extremely high threshold 
for use, the Chinese position has been tenable and believable. However, conven-
tional weapons lower the threshold for use, and crossing that threshold is easier 
to imagine.
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Furthermore, the deployment of antiship ballistic missiles would logically 
seem to blur the lines between offensive and defensive strategy.99 The most ef-
fective use of the ASBM would be a strike on a carrier strike group at long range 
as it steams toward waters east of the Taiwan Strait, before its cruise missiles 
and air-strike capability could be employed. Once the CSG came close enough 
to launch strikes, the asymmetric advantage of the ASBM would be limited. In 
other words, China might have to decide whether to strike fi rst, perhaps even 
preemptively. This could greatly impact crisis stability in a confrontation be-
tween China and the United States, as well as infl uence longer-term competi-
tion. The dangers of escalation would be grave, since the United States would 
need to consider China’s options and respond accordingly. Over the longer term, 
an arms race is a very real possibility: the United States, which still holds a sig-
nifi cant lead in naval power and most military technologies, would not sit still 
while China developed the ASBM.
The advent of an ASBM would be more than an incremental advance in 
weaponry; it could be a strategic “game changer,” as others have dubbed it.100 
Accordingly, the impact an ASBM capability will have on security perceptions, 
deterrence strategies, and escalatory control point to the need for a much more 
intensive and sustained military-to-military dialogue than is currently under 
way. As yet another sign of China’s growing might, the missile would be an 
important, singular development in the continuing shift away from U.S. stra-
tegic dominance in the western Pacifi c. Such a transformation would not go 
uncontested, and will bring a number of risks that could draw the two sides 
into heightened competition and even confl ict. But there will also be repeated 
opportunities to stave off military competition in favor of mutual accommoda-
tion and a cooperative regional approach. This process is dependent on build-
ing trust through transparency, as each side becomes more confi dent about the 
other’s capabilities and intents and as facts, not fears, can inform the actions and 
responses of decision makers on both sides.
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FY-3 seriesi 10 2009–2019j
Microwave sensors,
MWTS, 50–75 km resolution





Optical version (FY-4O) and 
microwave (FY-4M); micro-
wave sensor with real aperture 










Based on the DFH-4 satellite 
bus, the two satellites will be 
able to cover around 85 percent 
of the spacecraft’s trajectory
TABLE A-1
CHINA’S FUTURE SATELLITE PLANS (5–10 YEARS)
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 4, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss4/7
 HAGT & DURNIN A-2










CHINA’S FUTURE SATELLITE PLANS (5–10 YEARS)
Notes:
a. wgcv.ceos.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/2_OceanObservations_of_China_Jiang_b.pdf; www.aviso.oceanobs.com/en/missions/future-missions/hy-2/index.html; www.
soa.gov.cn/hyjww/ml/wx/A025007index_1.htm, Sun Zhihui, Director of SOA, “Review of China‘s Ocean Satellites over the Past Two Decades,” published in 
website of SOA, 12 April 2007 [孙志辉,国家海洋局局长, “团结奋进 再创辉煌-中国海洋卫星事业发展20年回顾”], www.moc.gov.cn/06hanghairi/hanghaizt/
hanghaidsj/200704/t20070412_217447.htm; and Bai Zhaoguang and Li Yifan,“Achievements and Prospect of China Ocean Satellite Technology,” Spacecraft 
Engineering, no. 4 (2008). The Haiyang-3 series will be equipped with SAR, all-weather, day and night coverage and far greater resolution. This will provide China 
with far greater ship detection capabilities. However, the Haiyang-3 series is currently only in preliminary stages of R&D and there is no timeline yet for its launch. 
China National Space Agency, “The Development of China’s Ocean Satellites” [国家航天局,中国海洋卫星的应用与发展], available at www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615708/
n676979/n2234896/n2234901/167394.html.
b. The objective of HY-2 is monitor the dynamic ocean environment with microwave sensors to detect sea surface wind fi eld, sea surface height, and sea surface 
temperature. It will include an altimeter dual-frequency in Ku- and C-bands, a scatterometer, and a microwave imager.
c. To provide services to safeguard the state’s maritime rights and interests, marine law enforcement, rapid response to national security, marine environmental 








i. FY-3 series is an improved generation of polar-orbiting heliosynchronous weather satellites with microwave sensors. See wgcv.ceos.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/
CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
j. FY-3B (test), 2009; FY-3AM1, 2011; FY-3PM1, 2012; FY-3RM (test), 2013; FY-3AM2, 2014; FY-3PM2, 2015; FY-3RM1, 2016; FY-3AM3, 2017; FY-3PM3, 2018; 
FY-3RM, 2019; see wgcv.ceos.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
k. FY-4 series is an improved generation of geosynchronous meteorological satellites with optical version (FY-4O) and microwave (FY-4M) satellite; see wgcv.ceos
.org/docs/plenary/wgcv28/CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
l. FY-4A (test), 2013; FY-4EAST1, 2015; FY-4WEST1, 2016; FY-4MS (test), 2017; FY-4EAST2, 2019; FY-4WEST2, 2020; FY-4MS, 2020; see wgcv.ceos.org/docs/
plenary/wgcv28/CMA_ZHANG_b.pdf.
m. The TDRSS (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System) is a system that can supply the data relay and TTC (telemetry, tracking, and control) service for the aircraft 
that are in low and middle earth orbit and other aircrafts, and aircraft and earth stations. Ye Peijian, “Outlook of China’s Aircraft and Moon Exploration in 2020,” 
Academic Reports published in CAS Academic Conference, 2000 [叶培建, “2020年我国航天器展望和月球探测工程,” 2000年中国科学院院士大会学术报告], 
available at it.sohu.com/20050311/n224639960.shtml.
n. Based on the DFH-4 satellite bus, the two satellites will be able to cover around 85 percent of the spacecraft’s trajectory, compared to 50 percent that was previ-
ously covered by Tian Lian-1. “Space Second Transmitter: Description of Satellite Data System,” BBS of cjdby.net, available at bbs.cjdby.net/viewthread
.php?tid=211901.
o. SINOSAT-4 satellite is hybrid communications payload made up of 24 C-band, 8 Ku-band, and 1 S-band active transponders. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/
satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE%C01%BA%C5&id=1.
p. The satellite will be based on SS/L‘s LS-1300 platform, which features qualifi ed, fl ight-proven subsystems and a long record of reliable operation. The satellite’s 
payload will carry both C- and Ku-band transponders and has a fi fteen-year mission life. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE
%C01%BA%C5&id=1. Sinosat-5 is a communications satellite to be based upon a DFH-4 platform. The spacecraft will feature a fi fteen-year design lifetime and 
a 5000-kg launch. Sinosat-6 is based upon a DFH-4 bus and will embark a hybrid communications payload made up of 24 C-band, 8 Ku-band, and 1 S-band 
active transponders. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE%C01%BA%C5&id=1.
q. The satellite will be based on SS/L’s LS-1300 platform, which features qualifi ed, fl ight-proven subsystems and a long record of reliable operation. The satellite’s 
payload will carry both C- and Ku-band transponders and has a fi fteen-year mission life. See www.chinadbsat.com.cn/satellite.asp?theName=%D6%D0%CE%
C01%BA%C5&id=1.
Sinosat-4, hybrid communica-
tions payload, 24 C-band, 8 
Ku-band, and 1 S-band active 
transponders; Sinosat-5, DFH-4 
platform, 15-year design lifetime; 
Sinosat-6, DFH-4 bus, a hybrid 
communications payload made 
up of 24 C-band, 8 Ku-band, and 
1 S-band active transponders
Based on SS/L’s LS-1300 
platform, C- and Ku-band tran-
sponders, a 15-year mission life.
31
Hagt and Durnin: China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile—Developments and Missing Links
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
